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American Political Science Review, Volume 107 - Issue 02

american politicalAMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, VOLUME 107 - ISSUE 02
 
Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa
JAN H. PIERSKALLA and FLORIAN M. HOLLENBACH
American Political Science Review, Volume 107, Issue 02, May 2013, pp 207-224
 
Capitol Mobility: Madisonian Representation and the Location and Relocation of Capitals in the United States
ERIK J. ENGSTROM and JESSE R. HAMMOND and JOHN T. SCOTT
American Political Science Review, Volume 107, Issue 02, May 2013, pp 225-240
 
Cold Case File: Indictable Acts and Officer Accountability in Marbury v. Madison
KAREN ORREN and CHRISTOPHER WALKER
American Political Science Review, Volume 107, Issue 02, May 2013, pp 241-258
 
Representation and Rights: The Impact of LGBT Legislators in Comparative Perspective
ANDREW REYNOLDS
American Political Science Review, Volume 107, Issue 02, May 2013, pp 259-274
 
Politics in the Mind's Eye: Imagination as a Link between Social and Political Cognition
MICHAEL BANG PETERSEN and LENE AARøe
American Political Science Review, Volume 107, Issue 02, May 2013, pp 275-293
 
Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict
NICHOLAS SAMBANIS and MOSES SHAYO
American Political Science Review, Volume 107, Issue 02, May 2013, pp 294-325
 
How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression
GARY KING and JENNIFER PAN and MARGARET E. ROBERTS
American Political Science Review, Volume 107, Issue 02, May 2013, pp 326-343
 
Crossing the Line: Local Ethnic Geography and Voting in Ghana
NAHOMI ICHINO and NOAH L. NATHAN
American Political Science Review, Volume 107, Issue 02, May 2013, pp 344-361
 
In Defense of Genopolitics
JAMES H. FOWLER and CHRISTOPHER T. DAWES
American Political Science Review, Volume 107, Issue 02, May 2013, pp 362-374
 
Candidate Genes and Voter Turnout: Further Evidence on the Role of 5-HTTLPR
KRISTEN DIANE DEPPE and SCOTT F. STOLTENBERG and KEVIN B. SMITH and JOHN R. HIBBING
American Political Science Review, Volume 107, Issue 02, May 2013, pp 375-381
 
Genopolitics and the Science of Genetics
EVAN CHARNEY and WILLIAM ENGLISH
American Political Science Review, Volume 107, Issue 02, May 2013, pp 382-395
 
Rawls and the Forgotten Figure of the Most Advantaged: In Defense of Reasonable Envy toward the Superrich—ERRATUM
JEFFREY EDWARD GREEN
American Political Science Review, Volume 107, Issue 02, May 2013, pp 396-396

Comparative Political Studies, Volume 45, Number 11, November 2012

cpsnovArticles
 
Does the Quality of Democracy Matter for Women’s Rights?
Just Debate and Democratic Transition in Chile and South Africa
Denise M. Walsh
 
Abstract
Gender scholars have found that democratization is rarely associated with advances in women’s rights and
 offer a range of reasons why. This article offers a new explanation that targets the quality of democracy in
 the leading institutions in the public sphere. The author argues that open and inclusive debate conditions, or women’s access, voice, and capacity for contestation in the legislature, civil society, and the media, enable them to shape debate content and pressure the state to respond with legislative reform. The author tests
 this claim through a structured, focused comparison of Chile and South Africa during the period prior to the transition to democracy, when the public sphere expanded and debate conditions were dynamic. The author finds that different levels of openness and inclusiveness coincide with different outcomes in women’s rights. This suggests that the quality of democracy in the public sphere shapes women’s rights
and that it may shape the outcomes of rights for other marginalized groups and in long-standing democracies as well. Chile democratization deliberative theory gender public sphere quality of democracy South Africa women’s rights
 
 
Opposition Parties and the Urban Poor in African Democracies
Danielle Resnick
 
Abstract
Africa’s urban poor increasingly represent a key constituency for electoral mobilization. Opposition parties, which are pivotal for democratic consolidation, have nevertheless exhibited disparate success at obtaining votes from this constituency. To explain why, this study focuses on the case of Zambia and draws on interviews
with political elites as well as a survey of informal sector workers in Lusaka. Instead of vote buying, ethnic alignments, or economic voting, these data show that the urban poor’s voting decisions are related to the strategies used by political parties to incorporate them into the political arena. Opposition parties that employ
populist strategies are more likely to win support from the urban poor than parties reliant on alternative modes of mobilization. The advantages of a populist strategy include greater differentiation from the myriad of purely personalistic parties in Africa and greater congruence with the policy priorities of the urban poor, including service delivery and jobs. Africa democratization opposition parties populism urbanization voting behavior
 
 
The Knowledge to Act: Chinese Migrant Labor Protests in Comparative Perspective
Jeffrey Becker
 
Abstract
How do workers in authoritarian states engage in protest, and how do they choose from available protest strategies? Through analysis of Chinese migrant labor protests from 2007 to 2008, the author examines how structural change
expanded opportunities for protest and how migrants took advantage of those opportunities. Where formal organization is prohibited, informal ties facilitate protest by providing material support and information. Although traditional kinship ties provide material support, urban ties between workers with no connections  before migrating to the cities provide information. Workers with access to urban ties are both more likely to engage in protest and more likely to engage in nonviolent protest through informal bargaining or the legal system. Little is known about the process of collective action among workers in authoritarian states, and understanding how
Chinese migrant workers engage in labor protests despite prohibitions on formal organization sheds light on this phenomenon. protest contention social ties migrant labor authoritarian states
 
 
Interest Group Influence in Authoritarian States:
The Political Determinants of Chinese Exchange Rate Policy
David A. Steinberg and Victor C. Shih
 
Abstract
Why do countries keep their exchange rates weak and undervalued? This article argues that domestic politics is more important than systemic factors, but existing domestic political explanations do not fully explain how interest group preferences and political institutions influence exchange rate policy. The authors argue that tradable industries do not always demand an undervalued exchange rate, but do so only when they are unable to receive other  compensatory policies. In addition, interest groups have a larger impact on exchange rate policy in nondemocratic
regimes than is often recognized: Autocrats select exchange rate policies that correspond to the preferences of the most powerful interest groups because lobby groups have access to the political process and leaders are sensitive to
their preferences. A case study of exchange rate policy in China supports these arguments. The major decisions to maintain an undervalued exchange rate in China were taken in response to demands for undervaluation from tradable industries. Second, the case study shows that exporters’ preferences for undervaluation ebb and flow with the policy mix: Tradable firms lobbied for an undervalued exchange rate when no other compensatory policies were implemented, but they did not insist on undervaluation in periods when they benefited from other state policies. The authors conclude that China keeps its exchange rate undervalued because the interest groups that support undervaluation are more powerful than those that oppose undervaluation. These findings indicate that interest groups influence exchange rate
policy in authoritarian regimes, but their preferences for undervalued exchange rates are quite malleable.

Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 57, Number 4, December 2012

admscienceArticles
 
Sleight of Hand? Practice Opacity, Third-party Responses,
and the Interorganizational Diffusion of Controversial Practices
Forrest Briscoe and Chad Murphy
 
Abstract
We examine the role of a practice’s opacity (versus transparency) in the interorganizational diffusion of
organizational practices. Though the opacity of a practice is typically thought to impede diffusion,
a political-cultural approach to institutions suggests that opacity can sometimes play a positive role.
Given that adoption decisions are embedded in a web of conflicting interests, transparency may bring
negative attention that, when observed by prospective adopters, inhibits them from following suit.
Opacity, in contrast, helps avoid that cycle. Using the curtailment of health benefits for retirees among
large U.S. employers (1989 to 2009), we compare the diffusion of transparent adoptions (i.e., partial or
complete benefit cuts) with opaque adoptions (i.e., spending caps that trigger disenrollment).
We find that transparent adoptions reduce subsequent diffusion of the practice to other organizations.
This effect is fully mediated by negative media coverage, which is itself conditioned by the presence of
opposition from interest groups. Opaque adoptions, in contrast, increase subsequent diffusion to other
organizations and are facilitated by the involvement of professional experts. Thus, in addition to providing
findings on practice opacity, our study contributes insight into how organizational fields shape diffusion
by illuminating the role of third parties in the spread of controversial practices.
interorganizational diffusion employment practices  institutional change
professions  social movements  legitimacy  retiree health benefits
 
 
How Entrepreneurship Evolves: The Founders of New Magazines in America, 1741–1860
Heather A. Haveman, Jacob Habinek, and Leo A. Goodman
 
Abstract
We craft a historically sensitive model of entrepreneurship linking individual actors to the evolving social structures they must navigate to acquire resources and launch new ventures. Theories of entrepreneurship and industry evolution suggest two opposing hypotheses: as an industry develops, launching a new venture
may become more difficult for all but industry insiders and the socially prominent because of competition from large incumbents, or it may become easier for all people because the legitimacy accorded to the industry simplifies the entrepreneurial task. To test these two conflicting claims, we study the American magazine industry from 1741 to 1860. We find that magazine publishing was originally restricted to publishing-industry insiders, professionals, and the highly educated, but most later founders came from outside publishing and more were of middling stature. Gains by entrepreneurs from the social periphery, however, were uneven: most were doctors and clergy without college degrees in small urban areas; magazines founded by industry insiders remained predominant in the industry centers. Our analysis demonstrates the importance of grounding studies of entrepreneurship in historical context. It also shows that entrepreneurship scholars must attend to temporal shifts within the focal industry and in society at large. entrepreneurship  organizational founding  industry evolution status
 
 
Free Spaces as Organizational Weapons of the Weak: Religious Festivals and
Regimental Mutinies in the 1857 Bengal Native Army
Hayagreeva Rao and Sunasir Dutta
 
Abstract
Free spaces are arenas insulated from the control of elites in organizations and societies. A basic question is whether they incubate challenges to authority. We suggest that free spaces foster collective empowerment when they assemble large numbers of people, arouse intense emotion, trigger collective identities, and enable individuals to engage in costly collective action. We analyze challenges to authority that invite repression: mutinies of regiments in the East India Company’s Bengal Native Army in India in 1857. We take advantage of an exogenous source of variation in the availability of free spaces—religious festivals. We predict that mutinies are most likely to occur at or right after a religious festival and find that the hazard of mutiny declines with time since a festival. We expect community ties to offer alternate avenues of mobilization, such as when regiments were stationed close to the towns and villages from which they were recruited. Moreover, festivals are likely to be more potent instantiations of free spaces when regiments were exposed to an oppositional identity, such as a Christian mission. Yet even free spaces have a limited ability to trigger collective action, such as when the political opportunity structure is adverse and prospective participants are deterred by greater chances of failure. These predictions are supported by analyses of daily event-history data of mutinies in 1857, suggesting that free spaces are an organizational weapon of the weak and not a substitute for dissent. social movements  collective identity  empowerment  organizing protest
 
 
Fatherhood and Managerial Style: How a Male CEO’s Children Affect the Wages of His Employees
Michael S. Dahl, Cristian L. Dezső, and David Gaddis Ross
 
Abstract
Motivated by a growing literature in the social sciences suggesting that the transition to fatherhood has a profound effect on men’s values, we study how the wages of employees change after a male chief executive officer (CEO) has children, using comprehensive panel data on the employees, CEOs, and families of CEOs in all but the smallest Danish firms between 1996 and 2006. We find that (a) a male CEO generally pays his employees less generously after fathering a child, (b) the birth of a daughter has a less negative influence on wages than does the birth of a son and has a positive influence if the daughter is the CEO’s first, and (c) the wages of female employees are less adversely affected than are those of male employees and positively affected by the CEO’s first child of either gender. We also find that male CEOs pay themselves more after fathering a child, especially after fathering a son. These results are consistent with a desire by the CEO to husband more resources for his family after fathering a child and the psychological priming of the CEO’s generosity after the birth of his first daughter and specifically toward women after the birth of his first child of either gender.

Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 57, Number 3 (September 2012)

administrativeArticles
 
Appeasing Equals: Lateral Deference in Organizational Communication
Alison R. Fragale, John J. Sumanth, Larissa Z. Tiedens, and Gregory B. Northcraft
 
Abstract
Using archival data on a year of e-mail exchanges at a division of Enron (Study 1) and a field study of
management professionals (Study 2), we explore how the relative hierarchical rank of a message
 sender and a message recipient affects expressions of verbal deference in organizational e-mail
communication. Verbal deference refers to linguistic markers that convey a willingness to yield to
another’s preferences or opinions as a sign of respect or reverence. Although prior research has
focused on upward deference in an organizational hierarchy, from lower-ranked senders to higher-
ranked recipients, we predict and find that the greatest amount of deference is expressed laterally,
between peers of equal or similar rank. Further, lateral deference is most frequently displayed by
those individuals most concerned with preserving their status and rank, confirming that lateral
deference may be used as a status-saving strategy designed to protect individuals from status loss
associated with “overstepping one’s place.”
deference  status  hierarchy  communication
 
 
Organizational Misfits and the Origins of Brokerage in Intrafirm Networks
Adam M. Kleinbaum
 
Abstract
To extend research on the effects of networks for career outcomes, this paper examines how
career processes shape network structure. I hypothesize that brokerage results from two distinct
mechanisms: links with former coworkers and with friends of friends accumulated as careers unfold.
Furthermore, I hypothesize that “organizational misfits”—people who followed career trajectories
that are atypical in their organization—will have access to more valuable brokerage opportunities
than those whose careers followed more conventional paths. I tested this hypothesis with career
history data recorded longitudinally for 30,000 employees in a large information technology firm
over six years and sequence-analyzed to measure individual-level fit with typical career paths in the
organization. Network position was measured using a unique data set of over 250 million electronic
mail messages. Empirical results support the hypotheses that diverse, and especially atypical, careers
have an effect on brokerage through mechanisms rooted in social capital, even when accounting for
endogeneity between networks and mobility. In theorizing about misfit from prototypical patterns,
this paper offers a new, theory-driven application of sequence-analytic methods as well as a novel
measure of brokerage based on interactions across observable boundaries, a complement to the
structural constraint measure based on interactions across holes in social structure.
social networks  social capital  career mobility  brokerage  identification
 
 
How Employees’ Prior Affiliations Constrain Organizational Network
Change: A Study of U.S. Venture Capital and Private Equity
Christopher I. Rider
 
Abstract
This paper investigates how organizations’ reliance on employees’ prior educational and employment
affiliations for both employment relationships and interorganizational relationships contributes to
inertia in organizational networks. Analyses of data from U.S. venture capital and private equity firms
support the theory I develop. First, increasing differences in educational prestige decrease both inter
personal co-employment rates and interorganizational co-investment rates. Second, two individuals
who share a prior educational or a prior employment affiliation are more likely to be employed by the
same organization than are two individuals who do not share such an affiliation. Third, the likelihood of
two organizations forming a co-investment relationship increases with the number of prior educational
or employment affiliations shared by their employees. I propose that these tendencies stabilize
advantaged organizations’ positions and limit disadvantaged organizations’ positional mobility, thereby
constraining change in interorganizational networks. Implications for studies of network evolution and
socioeconomic inequality are discussed.
networks  education  employment  affiliation
venture capital  private equity
 
 
Opportunity Structures in Established Firms: Entrepreneurship versus
Intrapreneurship in Mutual Funds
Aleksandra J. Kacperczyk
 
Abstract
This study revisits the well-established notion that large and mature organizations stifle an employee’s
ability and motivation to become an entrepreneur. Using unique data on U.S. mutual funds founded
between 1979 and 2005, I examine whether large and mature firms, which are typically associated with
lower individual rates of entrepreneurship, are also associated with lower individual rates of intrapreneurship.
The findings show that, though employees in large and mature organizations are less likely to transition
to entrepreneurship, they nonetheless exhibit a higher propensity to pursue venturing opportunities
inside the established firm than employees in smaller and younger firms. The results suggest that the
observed negative effect of large, mature organizations on entrepreneurship arises partly due to high
rates of intrapreneurship and that the stultification processes in such organizations are far less important
than has been generally assumed.

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Volume 24, Number 4, October 2012

teoritialpoliticArticles
On the rhetorical strategies of leaders: Speaking clearly, standing back,
and stepping down
Torun Dewan and David P Myatt
 
Abstract
Followers wish to coordinate their actions in an uncertain environment. A follower would like his action to be close to some ideal (but unknown) target; to reflect his own idiosyncratic preferences; and to be close to the actions of others. He learns about his world by listening to leaders. Followers fail to internalize the full benefits of coordination and so place insufficient emphasis on the focal views of relatively clear leaders. A leader sometimes stands back, by restricting what she says, and so creates space for others to be heard; in particular, a benevolent leader with outstanding judgement gives way to a clearer communicator in an attempt to encourage unity amongst her followers. Sometimes a leader receives
no attention from followers, and sometimes she steps down (says nothing); hence a leadership elite emerges from the endogenous choices of leaders and followers.
communication  leadership  rhetoric
 
 
An alternative mechanism through which economic inequality facilitates
collective action: Wealth disparities as a sign of cooperativeness
Tim Johnson and Oleg Smirnov
 
Abstract
Past models treat economic inequality as an exogenous condition that can provide individuals a dominant  incentive to produce collective goods unilaterally. Here we part with that tradition so as to treat economic inequality and collective action as endogenous, and to examine whether economic inequality can foster collective action even when all individuals can gain from free-riding. Using evolutionary game theory and computer simulations, we study whether cooperation can evolve when agents play multiple, one-shot prisoner’s dilemma (PD) games per generation and employ strategies that condition cooperative play on their game partners’ wealth holdings. In this game environment, we find that collective action succeeds via a strategy in which players choose to cooperate when joining a PD with an economic equal and defect when partnered with a player possessing wealth holdings unequal to their own. These results signal an alternative avenue through which economic inequality can influence the viability of collective action. Coequals  collective action  cooperation  economic inequality  prisoner’s dilemma
 
 
Dropping the unitary actor assumption: The impact of intra-party
delegation on coalition governance
Thomas M Meyer
 
Abstract
What happens to cabinet governance if parties do not act as ‘unitary actors’? In this paper, I examine the consequences of intra-party dissent for coalition governments in parliamentary systems. Drawing on the principal–agent literature, I develop a model in which party agents, namely cabinet ministers and legislators rather than parties as collective actors, decide on specific policies. The individuals’ amount of loyalty determines the degree of party unity. I use simulation techniques to analyze the power of an agenda-setting minister in a two-party coalition conditional on the level of party unity. The results suggest that the minister’s agenda-setting power diminishes if parliamentarians and cabinet members aim at implementing their personal policy preferences. However, the party not in charge of the respective portfolio may benefit from disunity within its own ranks. This counter-intuitive result raises doubts about the widespread view that internal unity strengthens the bargaining power of political parties. agency problems  delegation  parliamentary democracy parties unitary actor assumption
 
 
Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule
Steven J Brams and D Marc Kilgour
 
Abstract
We suggest a new approach to narrowing the field in elections, based on the ‘deservingness’ of candidates to be contenders in a runoff, or to be declared one of several winners. Instead of specifying some minimum percentage (e.g., 50) that the leading candidate must surpass to avoid a runoff (usually between the top two
candidates), we propose that the number of contenders depends on the distribution of votes among all candidates. Divisor methods of apportionment proposed by Jefferson and Webster, among others, provide measures of deservingness, but they can prescribe a runoff even when one candidate receives more than 50 percent of
 the vote. We propose a new measure of derservingness, called the Next-Two rule, which compares the performance of candidates to the two that immediately follow them. It identifies as contenders candidates  who are bunched together near the top. We apply the Next-Two rule to several empirical examples. apportionment methods  contenders in elections  runoff elections  short lists
 
 
Qualitative voting
Rafael Hortala-Vallve
 
Abstract
Can we devise mechanisms that allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences when monetary transfers are forbidden? Can minorities be decisive over those issues they feel very strongly about? As opposed to the usual voting system (one person – one decision – one vote), we propose a voting system where each
agent is endowed with a fixed number of votes that can be distributed freely among a set of issues that need to be approved or dismissed. Its novelty relies on allowing voters to express the intensity of their preferences in a simple manner. This voting system is optimal in a well-defined sense: in a strategic setting with two voters,
two issues and preference intensities uniformly and independently distributed across possible values, Qualitative Voting Pareto dominates Majority Rule and, moreover, achieves the only exante optimal (incentive-compatible) allocation. The result also holds true with three voters, as long as the voters’ preferences towards the issues differ sufficiently. alternatives to Majority Rule  conflict resolution intensity problem  voting
 
 
Partisan agenda control in the US house: A theoretical exploration
Jeffery A Jenkins and Nathan W Monroe
 
Abstract
While a number of scholars have focused on the importance of partisan agenda control in the US House,  few have examined its uneven consequences within the majority party. In this paper, we explore ‘counterfactual’ utility distributions within the majority party, by comparing policy outcomes under a party-less median voter model
to policy outcomes under party-based positive and negative agenda control models. We show that the distribution of policy losses and benefits resulting from agenda control are quite similar for both the positive and negative varieties. In both cases, moderate majority-party members are made worse off by the exercise of partisan agenda control, while those to the extreme side of the majority-party median benefit disproportionately. We also consider the benefit of agenda control for the party as a whole, by looking at the way changes in majority-party homogeneity affect the
summed utility across members. Interestingly, we find that when the distance between the floor and majority-party medians decreases, the overall value of positive and negative agenda control diminishes. However, we also find support
for the ‘conditional party government’ notion that, as majority-party members’ preferences become more similar, they have an increased incentive to grant agenda-setting power to their leaders.