Referensi Jurnal & Buku Politik

Comparative Political Studies Volume 45 Number 6, July 2012

Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions
Abel Escribà-Folch
This article explores how international sanctions affect authoritarian rulers’ decisions concerning repression and public spending composition. Rulers whose budgets are not severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. When budget constraints are severe, dictators are more likely to increase repression. Using data on regime types, public expenditures and spending composition (1970–2000) as well as on repression levels (1976–2001), I show that the empirical patterns conform well to the theoretical
expectations. Single-party regimes, when targeted by sanctions, increase spending on subsidies and transfers which largely benefit their key constituencies. Likewise, military regimes increase their expenditures on goods and services, which include military equipment and soldiers’ and officers’ wages. Conversely, personalist regimes targeted by sanctions reduce spending in all categories and thus increase repression more than other autocracies.
Left Parties, Poor Voters, and Electoral Participation in Advanced Industrial Societies
Christopher J. Anderson and Pablo Beramendi
Although income inequality is an important normative issue for students of democratic politics, little is known about its effects on citizens’ electoral participation. The authors develop a formal model of the incentives for left parties to mobilize lower income voters. It posits that countries’ income distributions and competition on the left provide different incentives for left parties to mobilize lower income voters. In the absence of political competition, higher levels of income inequality reduce the incentives of dominant left parties to target lower income voters. However, competition on the left creates incentives for a dominant left party to mobilize lower income voters, thus counteracting the negative impact of inequality on parties’ incentives to target them. As a consequence, the negative association between inequality and turnout at the aggregate level is muted by the presence of several parties on the left side of the political spectrum. Using aggregate data on elections in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries between 1980 and 2002 and election surveys collected in the second wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project, the authors find strong and consistent support for their model.
Reverse Contamination: Burning and Building Bridges in Mixed-Member Systems
Ellis Krauss, Kuniaki Nemoto, and Robert Pekkanen
Why would a candidate in a mixed-member electoral system willingly forego the chance to be dual listed in the party list tier along with the single-member district tier? Mixed-member systems create a “reverse contamination effect” through which list rankings provide important information to voters and thus influence behavior in the nominal tier. Rankings signal importance of the candidate within the party and also constitute information about the likelihood that the candidate will be elected off
the list tier. Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems create different incentives for parties and candidates to send voters different signals. Candidates in Japan’s MMM “burned their bridges” successfully and gained more votes. In New Zealand’s MMP system, parties instead built “bridges” between the proportional representation and nominal tiers by sending different signals to voters through list rankings.
Accounting for the Effects of Identity on Political Behavior: Descent, Strength of Attachment, and Preferences in the Regions of Spain
Lachen T. Chernyha and Steven L. Burg
This article examines the determinants of identification within the autonomous communities (ACs) of Spain and explores whether “activated identities” guide behavior. The authors test this hypothesized effect empirically and demonstrate that regional and especially (non-Spanish) national activated identity affect preferences for exclusionary policies and for greater autonomy or independence for the AC. Both preferences and activated identities increase the likelihood of voting for regional, rather than statewide, political parties. The authors argue that the strength of attachment to identity (i.e., to the AC to or Spain) and the effect of identities on preferences constitute the mechanisms that link identity to behaviors. Thus, the authors contribute to, and help to clarify, both the theoretical and empirical literatures focused on the relationship between identity and behaviors.