Referensi Jurnal & Buku Politik

Journal of Democracy, Volume 23, Number 3, July 2012

jorunal democracyArticles
The Transformation of the Arab World
Olivier Roy pp. 5-18
Abstract (summary)
The demonstrators referred to no Middle Eastern geopolitical conflicts, burned no U.S. or Israeli flags, offered no chants in favor of the main (that is to say, Islamist) opposition parties, and expressed no wish for the establishment of an Islamic state or the implementation of shari'a. [...]despite the Western media's frantic quest to put a face on events by talking up some of the protests' astonishingly young and modern spokespersons, the demonstrators produced no charismatic leaders. [...]the Arab Spring belied the "Arab predicament": It simply would not follow the script which holds that the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict is fostering an ever-growing Islamization within Arab societies, a search for charismatic leaders, and an
identification with supranational causes.
 
 
Implosion, Atrophy, or Revolution?
Lilia Shevtsova pp. 19-32
Abstract (summary)
 [...]recently, the Kremlin's constant clampdowns and discrediting campaigns prevented the opposition from gaining strength. At both the elite and popular levels, the country is replete with powerful rent-seeking groups that benefit from the existing system and can be expected to fight for it. [...]the postcommunist elites have built a system that deliberately lacks constitutional and political means for resolving conflicts and deadlocks.
 
 
An Autopsy of Managed Democracy
Ivan Krastev, Stephen Holmes pp. 33-45
Abstract (summary)
 [...]we are only now, for the first time, able to look inside the political mystery of managed democracy and explain how it actually worked. Surveys show that even as a cadre of diehards is still regularly taking to the streets to protest the regime, the number of those who tell pollsters that they are ready to protest has precipitously declined.) In any case, in order to coax voters to the ballot boxes, Putin was forced to confess that his power was endangered by an internal threat.
 
 
The Strange Alliance of Democrats and Nationalists
Nicu Popescu pp. 46-54
Abstract (summary)
In 2011, Prime Minister Putin laid flowers on the grave of a Russian football fan whose death after a brawl with some men from the North Caucasus sparked nationalist riots near the Kremlin walls. According to official figures, Russia's population fell from 148 million in 1992 to 142 million in 2010.
 
 
The Protesters and The Public
Denis Volkov pp. 55-62
Abstract (summary)
Yet there were warning signs, including internal conflict in Russia's political system and growing civic activism. Since the global economic crisis began to hit Russia in 2008, Russians have had a growing sense of uncertainty about the future, coupled with a feeling that the country is moving in the wrong direction. Authorities tend to ignore problems until citizens' frustrations spill over into (not necessarily peaceful) protest, at which point officials adopt some mixture of repression plus halfhearted measures to redress grievances, hoping that unrest will subside and the public mood will improve. [...]protest is a given, even if saying exactly where, when, and
how the next one will break out is difficult in a partly closed society such as Russia's, where civic problems and social stresses are not openly discussed.
 
 
Can There Be a Color Revolution?
Sharon L. Wolchik pp. 63-70
Abstract (summary)
Translate [unavailable for this document]
The development, implementation, and diffusion of this model involved transnational networks of both domestic actors (the political opposition and civil society activists) and international democracy supporters (the governments of the United States and several European countries, the EU, and numerous private foundations). The basic elements of the model included 1) a more united political opposition committed to supporting a common candidate; 2) energetic campaigns by civil society groups to register voters, get out the vote, and inform citizens about issues and their rights; 3) the development of some form of independent media or plans to counteract the state's monopoly on communication; 4) pressure on incumbents to make the
electoral playing field more level by increasing opposition representation on electoral
commissions and allowing the deployment of domestic and international election observers; 5) the use of exit polls and parallel vote counts; and 6) when incumbents refused to vacate office, mass protests and demonstrations.5 Typically, the model also included innovative campaign activities by opposition candidates and parties, such as bus and bicycle tours, marches, meetings with citizens, and door-to-door canvassing in order to reach previously apathetic or alienated voters, especially those outside the capital.
 
 
Turkey and Thailand: Unlikely Twins
Duncan McCargo, Ayşe Zarakol pp. 71-79
Abstract (summary)
Translate [unavailable for this document]
[...]they are unlike Western states in that they had to adapt quickly to an international system whose rules they had little part in shaping. [...]despite the absence of formal colonization, both the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Siam had experiences with European intrusion that might fairly be called highly traumatic. 3 As a result, in both countries there emerged, first within the monarchy and then within the newly Westernized military-bureaucratic establishment, a reformist outlook that doggedly equated independence with state-led modernization and national cohesion-a cohesion that, given the heterogeneity of both societies at the turn of the twentieth century, could not be passively assumed but had to be aggressively
achieved. [...]after brief experiments with insular foreign policies, both countries moved squarely into the Western camp, following state-led but nonsocialist development strategies throughout the twentieth century.
 
 
African Elections: Two Divergent Trends
Kennedy Ochieng’ Opalo pp. 80-93
Abstract (summary)
Translate [unavailable for this document]
According to Biya, he won the October 9 voting by a landslide of 78 percent. 1 Fraud charges were widespread.2 These two elections are symptomatic of the divergent trends that are now affecting the prospects of democratic consolidation in Africa. [...]the findings do not seem to apply much beyond Africa, and authoritarianism has thus far defied electoral competition in Africa, so closer study is needed to determine what mechanisms (if any) might make repeated elections a source of democratization.4 To pursue this inquiry, it will be helpful to analyze both
broader trend data and particular case studies. [...]it will be important to examine emerging trends in democratization (or authoritarian reversion) in Africa, with special attention to the manner in which ruling parties have dominated national legislatures over the last twenty years and stopped opposition parties from gaining footholds in these bodies.
 
 
Oil, Politics, and Ghana’s Democracy
E. Gyimah-Boadi, H. Kwasi Prempeh pp. 94-108
Abstract (summary)
Translate [unavailable for this document]
Ghana is not new to resource wealth. Since the early colonial period, it has depended heavily on proceeds from the export of gold and other minerals, timber, and cocoa beans. Ghana's pre- oil record of exceptional democratic progress is widely acknowledged. Since democratic government was restored in 1993, the country has held five free and fair elections and twice transferred power peacefully from one party to the other (in 2001 and 2009).
 
 
The DRC’s Crumbling Legitimacy
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Pascal Kalume Kambale pp. 109-120
Abstract (summary)
 [...]for both the Congolese government and the international community, the stakes were high. From compilation centers across the country came reports of improprieties-including threats to exclude ballots that had been torn or that came from polling stations that been burned down, as well as rumors of more ballots being flown in from abroad. [...]counting took place as opposition charges of massive fraud echoed through local and international media.
 
 
Senegal: What Will Turnover Bring?
Catherine Lena Kelly pp. 121-131
Abstract (summary)
 [...]the country's regime would be better described as competitive authoritarian-democratic rules exist, but "incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent . . . that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy. Wade also distributed ample patronage in order to tilt the playing field in favor of the ruling party, reviving old packable institutions, such as the Economic and Social Council (in February 2008) and the Senate (in January 2007), and filling their salaried posts with PDS allies. [...]by using his access to the state to pay monthly salaries, dispense diplomatic passports, and grant government employment to politicians who joined the PDS's ruling coalition, Wade chipped away at
opposition unity.
 
 
How Things Went Wrong
Jacques Rupnik pp. 132-137
Abstract (summary)
The suspicion is well founded, for the new basic law and its enabling acts have turned what are supposed to be politically neutral bodies such as the Constitutional Court, the Central Bank, and the offices of the Ombudsman and the Public Prosecutor into arms of the ruling party. [...]Orbán and his lieutenants have downgraded or done away with the checks and balances that are widely considered essential for the rule of law.
 
 
Disabling the Constitution
Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai, Kim Lane Scheppele pp. 138-146 |
Abstract (summary)
The Constitutional Court, before it could be packed with a working majority of new judges, struck down this tax as unconstitutional.4 Parliament responded by amending the constitution to take away the Court's power over fiscal matters.5 Now the Court can no longer review for constitutionality any laws about budgets or taxes unless those laws affect rights that are hard to infringe with budget measures (rights to life, dignity, data privacy, thought, conscience, religion, and citizenship). There are numerous other troubling aspects of this new constitutional order: the gerrymandering of election districts, which makes it hard for any other party to win
an election in the foreseeable future; the removal of the statute of limitations for crimes committed during the Soviet period, which opens the door to selective prosecution of the political opposition; an unwisely large number of "cardinal" laws (that is, laws requiring a two- thirds vote in parliament) that fix details of state policy on issues such as taxes, pensions, and family protection; the troubling constitutional preamble, which gives constituent power to ethnic Hungarians both at home and abroad while leaving out all other citizens; the references to the historic constitution, which invite (among other things) revisiting the 1920 Treaty of
Trianon (which set Hungary's borders after the Habsburg Empire was defeated in the First World War); the sudden deregistration of more than three-hundred churches that had operated in Hungary for years; and incursions on the independence of the Hungarian Central Bank.
 
 
Can Outsiders Help?
Erin K. Jenne, Cas Mudde  pp. 147-155
Abstract (summary)
Yet a number of factors hamstring outsiders' ability to persuade Fidesz to reverse its illiberal policies. Because Fidesz came to power through free and fair elections and Orbán is not a radical right-wing ideologue like the late Jörg Haider in Austria, the EU has had difficulty framing a valid legal argument against the Fidesz leadership. Orbán has consistently claimed democratic legitimacy, while noting the lack of democratic accountability in the EU and IMF.\n Thus foreign support for the opposition would risk discrediting the movement altogether. [...]even if the opposition succeeded in taking back the government in the next elections, Fidesz has achieved a grip over the country's public institutions so tight that it will likely require more than a mere
change in political leadership to unclench it.
 
 
The Surprising Success of Multiparty Presidentialism
Carlos Pereira, Marcus André Melo pp. 156-170
Abstract (summary)
Indonesia has been stable as a multiparty presidential regime since the fall of Suharto's authoritarian New Order and the transition to democracy in 1999. Since 2004, the governing coalition there has consisted of five parties with seats in congress plus eighteen supporting but unseated parties.3 The unexpected stability of multiparty presidential regimes demands further research. [...]will this tendency not become all the more worrisome when such executives enjoy only weak support from parties and face fragmented legislatures? [...]constitutional-design experts viewed strong presidencies as terrible things to introduce into multiparty systems. 6 In
the 1980s, comparativists went part of the way toward correcting this bias.

Governance: An International Journal, Volume 25 Issue 1 January 2012

governance1.     Commentary
Does Governance Matter? CHARLES KENNY
 
2.     Introduction to Special Issue
A New Age of Uncertainty DAVID COEN and ALASDAIR ROBERTS
 
3.     Articles
Democracies and Deficits: Prospects for Fiscal Responsibility in Democratic Nations 

PAUL POSNER and JÓN BLÖNDAL
 
The financial crisis had significant implications for the fiscal positions of OECD. As nations seek to cope with the economic contraction, budget deficits and debt have risen to near record postwar levels. As the crisis in Europe and other advanced economies has deepened, fiscal consolidation will have to be coupled, and even preceded, by actions to jump-start crippled economies. Nonetheless, when fiscal consolidation becomes necessary, nations that procrastinate by waiting
for a crisis to provide cover for the politically hard choices will pay a steep price indeed both economically and politically. Many in the academic and policy community have raised questions about whether advanced democracies have the political wherewithal to respond to gathering fiscal pressures through early and timely action. Recent fiscal actions in advanced nations suggest that democracies are not doomed to wait for market shocks and crises. Rather, leaders have shown that fiscal sacrifice can be achieved in ways that promote electability. In this article, we discuss the
impetus for democratic fiscal actions and the strategies used to gain public support.
 
 
Stories and Interests in Finance: Agendas of Governance before and after the Financial Crisis   JULIE FROUD, ADRIANA NILSSON, MICHAEL MORAN and KAREL WILLIAMS

The financial crisis can be understood in many different terms. In this article, it is analyzed in terms of the unfolding of a series of elite narratives that shaped the agenda of regulation before the crisis, that were damaged by the crisis, and that were then reframed and recounted again in the wake of the crisis. The form of these stories differs in subtle ways by jurisdiction, and thus the fate of postcrisis regulatory practice likewise differs.
 
 
Ideas and Coordination in Policymaking: The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009  
JOHN GIEVE and COLIN PROVOST
 
Policy change occurs because coalitions of actors are able to take advantage of political conditions to translate their strong beliefs about policy into ideas, which are turned into policy. A coalition's ability to define a problem helps to keep policies in place, but it can also cause coalitions to develop blind spots. For example, policy subsystem actors will often neglect the need for coordination between governmental actors. We examine the financial crisis of 2007–2009 to show how entrenched policy ideas can cause subsystem actors to overlook the need for policy coordination. We first analyze the prevalent idea that policymakers should aim to keep inflation
low and stable while employing light touch regulation to financial markets. We then demonstrate how this philosophy led to a lack of coordination between monetary and regulatory policy in the subprime mortgage market. We conclude with thoughts about the need for coordination in future economic policy.
 
 
Into an Age of Multiple Austerities? Public Management and Public Service Bargains across OECD Countries  
MARTIN LODGE and CHRISTOPHER HOOD
 
This article focuses on Public Service Bargains (PSBs) in the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) world in an age of austerity and makes four main claims. First, both logic and recent history suggest that states can respond to financial crises in more than one way. Second, we argue that the pressures on existing PSBs are not all the same in this group of states, given observable differences in their financial vulnerability. Third, we analyze countries'
differential exposure to two other major challenges, namely, that of population aging and environmental risk. Fourth, we show that those areas of vulnerability can counteract one another in some cases but be mutually reinforcing in others, and we argue that “triply vulnerable” states in a composite analysis are those likely to face the strongest pressure to change their existing PSBs. We conclude that while homogenizing pressures cannot be ignored, PSB diversity is likely to continue.
 
 
Developing Countries Will Follow Post-crisis OECD Reforms but Not Passively

This Time 

MATT ANDREWS
 
Will reforms emerging from the 2008 crisis have a global impact and influence developingcountries? Evidence suggests that this happened before, after meltdowns in the 1970s. This article deconstructs how reforms diffused in this period and why countries followed different reform timelines. Institutional theory and a descriptive analysis of post-1970s experience suggest that countries followed different reform paths. Developing countries copied reforms seen as legitimate in various OECD countries, supported by entities upon which developing countries were dependent. The article argues that developing countries may not follow the same path now.
Endogenous discussions about reform options are more common in developing countries now. More external reform alternatives have also emerged from new development partners such as China, and it is unclear that countries such as the USA will chart postcrisis reform paths developing countries perceive as worthy of following.
 
 
Double Bind: Governing the Economy in an ICT Era  
JOHN ZYSMAN and DAN BREZNITZ
 
The recent financial debacle was preceded by a long complex evolution in the way firms created value and organized. The fragmentation of production, intense global competition, and the information and communication technology (ICT)-enabled transformation of services are all part of a story that was framed by, and in turn further framed, ideologies of deregulation and self- regulation. In the aftermath of the crisis political leaders worldwide find themselves in a heightened double bind. On one side, the demands for rules allowing experimentation and innovation are sharpened as growth and job creation are needed; on the other side, the demands are heightened for the state to act and regulate markets to prevent future crisis. The article
focuses on the development of ICT, the main general-purpose technology of our time, and how the the ways it allows value to be created interacted with the politics regulating uses and defining the winners and losers.

Party Politics, Volume 18 Number 4 July 2012

party politicsArticles
Newness as a winning formula for new political parties Allan Sikk
Abstract
Previous studies on new political parties have assumed that they either represent new or ignored cleavages or issues, or emerge in order to cleanse an ideology deficiently represented by an existing party. Four highly successful parties analyzed in this article manifestly fail to comply with these assumptions. The article proposes a parsimonious two-dimensional typology of new parties refining the one suggested by Lucardie (2000), incorporating a new type of parties based on the project of
newness. The four parties analyzed fall into the latter category as they fought on the ideological territory of existing parties yet did not attempt to purify an ideology. It is argued that newness has been an appealing project for new and rejuvenating parties everywhere, and the experiences from new democracies should be taken seriously also by those working on established democracies.
 
 
Political market orientation: A framework for understanding relationship structures in political parties Robert P. Ormrod and Heather Savigny
Abstract
This article is motivated by the growing need to integrate the current political science and marketing literature in order to provide a deeper understanding of the behaviour of political actors and their relationships with relevant stakeholder groups. In our article, we demonstrate how Ormrod’s conceptual model of political market orientation complements political science models of party organization by drawing attention to the competing interests of stakeholders in shaping party strategy and organizational structure. We treat parties as a multitude of actors rather than as
monolithic entities and thus address the dearth of literature on the micro foundations of parties. Whilst the underlying conceptualization of a political market orientation draws on the management- based ‘relationship marketing’ approach, we acknowledge that the commercial and political contexts are not isomorphic, and thus we strive for contextual sensitivity. By adopting this approach it is hoped that the fears noted by political scientists that political marketing is solely concerned with applying standard management models to political parties with the resulting emphasis on communication tactics at election time, together with a more general ‘commodification’ of politics,
can be assuaged.
 
 
Legislative organization in MMP: The case of New Zealand Kuniaki Nemoto, Robert Pekkanen, Ellis S. Krauss, Nigel S. Roberts
Abstract
How do electoral systems affect legislative organization? The change in electoral systems from Single Member District plurality (SMD) to Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) in New Zealand can illuminate how electoral incentives affect the distribution of cabinet positions. Because in SMD the outcome of individual local districts determines the number of seats a party wins collectively, New Zealand parties deploy cabinet posts in order to shore up the electoral fortunes of individual members. In MMP, the total number of seats a party receives is determined by the votes in the
proportional representation (PR) portion for the party, which eliminates the incentives to reward electorally unsafe members with cabinet positions. We show that strong cabinet members, measured through experience as prior terms in the cabinet position, are still likely to be retained.
 
 
How many political parties are there, really? A new measure of the ideologically cognizable number of parties/party groupings

Bernard Grofman and Reuben Kline
Abstract
We offer a new measure of the ideologically cognizable number of political parties/party groupings that is intended to be complementary to the standard approach to counting the effective number of political parties – the Laakso–Taagepera index (1979). This approach allows the possibility of precise
measurement of concepts such as polarized pluralism or fragmented bipolarism and is applicable to both unidimensional and multidimensional representations of party locations. Using recent CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) data on one-dimensional representations of party locations in four real-world examples (two of which are available in an online appendix), we find that Slovenia, treated initially as a five-party system, has its optimal reduction as a two-bloc/party system, as does Spain, which is treated initially as a four-party system. However, Canada, treated initially as a four- party system, has its optimal reduction as a three-bloc/party system if we look at a unidimensional representation of the party space, while it remains a four-bloc system if we draw on Johnston’s two- dimensional characterization of Canadian political competition. Finally, the Czech Republic, initially a five-party system, is optimally reduced to a system with four party groupings.
 
 
The paradoxical effects of decline: Assessing party system change and the role of the catch-all parties in Germany following the 2009 federal election Charles Lees
Abstract
This article examines the impact of party system change in Germany on the role, status and power of the two catch-all parties (CDU/CSU and SPD) in the light of the 2009 federal election. It argues that party system change has had a paradoxical impact. On the one hand, the decline in the overall catch- all vote undermines the two parties’ integrative function. On the other, the presence of three small
parties (FDP, Greens, Left Party) means that, with the possible exception of the Greens, no single small party has the potential to be ‘kingmaker’ and, because of their relative positions in ideological space, neither can they act in concert to extract concessions from the two catch-all parties. Thus, despite the impressive performance of the FDP in the 2009 federal election and the electoral meltdown suffered by the SPD, in office-seeking terms the catch-all parties are currently less vulnerable to small party threats of defection to alternative coalitions.
 
 
Electoral regimes and party-switching: Floor-crossing in South Africa's local legislatures
Eric McLaughlin
Abstract
This article presents an inquiry into the causes of party-switching under two different electoral regimes. It exploits a natural experiment in South Africa, where a large number of local legislatures are elected using the same mixed system, to examine how the party-switching behaviours of legislators elected under proportional representation (PR) rules may differ systematically from those of legislators elected from single-member districts. It confirms the findings of other single-legislature
studies in concluding that PR legislators are more likely, ceteris paribus, to defect. It highlights several characteristics of legislative bodies and legislative districts that influence defection rates for legislators in South Africa. In so doing, it uncovers evidence that, despite the young age of South Africa’s post-1994 party system, the unexpectedly large volume of party-switching that occurred there was neither a simple party realignment nor an opportunistic scramble, but rather a highly
organized, structured and strategic market for parties.
 
 
Gendered nationalism: The gender gap in support for the Scottish National Party
Robert Johns, Lynn Bennie, and James Mitchell
Abstract
Recent major surveys of the Scottish electorate and of Scottish National Party (SNP) members have revealed a distinct gender gap in support for the party. Men are markedly more likely than women to vote for the SNP and they comprise more than two-thirds of its membership. In this article, we use data from those surveys to test various possible explanations for the disproportionately male support for the SNP. While popular accounts have focused on the gendered appeal of recent leaders and on the party’s fluctuating efforts at achieving gender equality in its parliamentary representation, we find much stronger support for a different explanation. Women are less inclined to support and to join the SNP because they are markedly less supportive of its central objective of independence for Scotland. Since men and women barely differ in their reported national identities, the origins of this
gender gap in support for independence presents a puzzle for further research.
 
 
Party organization and concurrent multi-level local campaigning: The 2007
Scottish elections under MMP and STV

Alistair Clark
Abstract
Parties often have to campaign for two or more levels of office at the same time. However, declining levels of organization means that the demands of concurrent elections can potentially increase the demands on volunteer party organizations considerably. These demands are multiplied by the concurrent use of different electoral systems which provide party organizations with different incentives. The article examines how party organizations deal with such circumstances through a study of constituency party organizations in the 2007 Scottish parliamentary and local government elections. Parties were forced to campaign concurrently at three levels – local council, Scottish Parliament constituency and regional list – under two different electoral systems, STV (single- transferable vote) and MMP (mixed-member proportional). I argue that: there may be economies of scale for party organizations in fighting concurrent elections; while there may be evidence of vote- maximization activity at each level, local organizations are likely to give priority to their efforts
towards higher level institutions and those on which their efforts potentially have a direct effort; and that the degree of local campaign effort is mediated by the extent of party organization and previous success in the area concerned.

Comparative Political Studies Volume 45 Number 6, July 2012

CPSArticles
Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions
Abel Escribà-Folch
 
Abstract
This article explores how international sanctions affect authoritarian rulers’ decisions concerning repression and public spending composition. Rulers whose budgets are not severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. When budget constraints are severe, dictators are more likely to increase repression. Using data on regime types, public expenditures and spending composition (1970–2000) as well as on repression levels (1976–2001), I show that the empirical patterns conform well to the theoretical
expectations. Single-party regimes, when targeted by sanctions, increase spending on subsidies and transfers which largely benefit their key constituencies. Likewise, military regimes increase their expenditures on goods and services, which include military equipment and soldiers’ and officers’ wages. Conversely, personalist regimes targeted by sanctions reduce spending in all categories and thus increase repression more than other autocracies.
 
 
Left Parties, Poor Voters, and Electoral Participation in Advanced Industrial Societies
Christopher J. Anderson and Pablo Beramendi
 
Abstract
Although income inequality is an important normative issue for students of democratic politics, little is known about its effects on citizens’ electoral participation. The authors develop a formal model of the incentives for left parties to mobilize lower income voters. It posits that countries’ income distributions and competition on the left provide different incentives for left parties to mobilize lower income voters. In the absence of political competition, higher levels of income inequality reduce the incentives of dominant left parties to target lower income voters. However, competition on the left creates incentives for a dominant left party to mobilize lower income voters, thus counteracting the negative impact of inequality on parties’ incentives to target them. As a consequence, the negative association between inequality and turnout at the aggregate level is muted by the presence of several parties on the left side of the political spectrum. Using aggregate data on elections in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries between 1980 and 2002 and election surveys collected in the second wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project, the authors find strong and consistent support for their model.
 
 
Reverse Contamination: Burning and Building Bridges in Mixed-Member Systems
Ellis Krauss, Kuniaki Nemoto, and Robert Pekkanen
 
Abstract
Why would a candidate in a mixed-member electoral system willingly forego the chance to be dual listed in the party list tier along with the single-member district tier? Mixed-member systems create a “reverse contamination effect” through which list rankings provide important information to voters and thus influence behavior in the nominal tier. Rankings signal importance of the candidate within the party and also constitute information about the likelihood that the candidate will be elected off
the list tier. Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems create different incentives for parties and candidates to send voters different signals. Candidates in Japan’s MMM “burned their bridges” successfully and gained more votes. In New Zealand’s MMP system, parties instead built “bridges” between the proportional representation and nominal tiers by sending different signals to voters through list rankings.
 
 
Accounting for the Effects of Identity on Political Behavior: Descent, Strength of Attachment, and Preferences in the Regions of Spain
Lachen T. Chernyha and Steven L. Burg
 
Abstract
This article examines the determinants of identification within the autonomous communities (ACs) of Spain and explores whether “activated identities” guide behavior. The authors test this hypothesized effect empirically and demonstrate that regional and especially (non-Spanish) national activated identity affect preferences for exclusionary policies and for greater autonomy or independence for the AC. Both preferences and activated identities increase the likelihood of voting for regional, rather than statewide, political parties. The authors argue that the strength of attachment to identity (i.e., to the AC to or Spain) and the effect of identities on preferences constitute the mechanisms that link identity to behaviors. Thus, the authors contribute to, and help to clarify, both the theoretical and empirical literatures focused on the relationship between identity and behaviors.